Using a new representation theorem for additive cost sharing methods as sums of path methods, we show that many of the standard additive cost sharing methods (Aumann-Shapley, Shapley Shubik, and Serial Cost) are consistent. These results follow directly from a simple su cient condition for consistency: being generated by associative paths, which can be used to show consistency for many other methods.
Introduction
The principle of consistency has a long history in many economic allocation problems. (See 22] for a detailed review and bibliography.) For example, under standard assumptions, the I would like to thank Rich Mclean for many detailed comments and suggestions, Ori Haimanko for pointing out an error in an earlier version of this paper, , Herv e Moulin, Yves Sprumont, and Y.T. Wang for helpful comments. This paper contains results from two previous working papers: \Paths in Additive Cost Sharing" and \Weak and \Strong Consistency in Additive Cost Sharing". Email: friedman@econ.rutgers.edu. WWW: http://econ.rutgers.edu/home/friedman 1 Walrasian allocation is consistent in the appropriate sense and indeed can be characterized by consistency in combination with other basic axioms. The basic idea behind consistency in any allocation problem is that, if an agent leaves the problem and takes her share with her, then the allocation among the remaining agents is unchanged.
The application of consistency to cost sharing methods 1 (CSMs) with binary demands was introduced by Young 26] who showed that the Shapley value is the unique strongly consistent method. However, Young's de nition of consistency is quite demanding. Recently, Hart and Mas- Colell 12] showed, using a more standard notion of consistency, that the Shapley value is the unique consistent extension which \divides the surplus equally" in 2 person games, using a new tool, the potential of a game. In this paper we show that, when restricted to additive methods, the existence and uniqueness of consistent extensions can be analyzed much more directly. First we provide a su cient condition for a CSM to be consistent. Using this we show that the AumannShapley, Shapley-Shubik and Serial Cost methods are all consistent as are the weighted, asymmetric, versions of all of these.
Next we introduce an extremely weak version of consistency, dummy consistency, and pro-vide a complete characterization of the set of dummy consistent CSMs. Dummy consistency is an extremely natural requirement and thus may be applicable in a wider variety of situations than ordinary consistency. Nonetheless, in many cases the existence and uniqueness of dummy-consistent extensions implies the existence and uniqueness of consistent extensions.
This allows us to easily prove the existence and uniqueness of consistent extensions from 2 agent problems to multi-agent problems for the Aumann-Shapley and Serial Cost methods, while the Shapley-Shubik method may have multiple extensions, but a unique symmetric one. 2 Our results and method of analysis are based on a new representation for additive CSMs based on the idea of a path method, which is a natural generalization of the Aumann-Shapley formula. This representation method is also of independent interest for other applications (see, e.g., 5, 7, 6] ).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the structure of the class of additive CSMs and describes their representation as sums of path methods, the key technique used in this paper. Section 3 provides a su cient condition for a CSM to be consistent and a complete characterization of the dummy-consistent methods. We conclude in Section 4 with the analysis of consistent extensions. Several proofs are in the appendix.
Additive Cost Sharing
We will consider the problem of dividing the cost of production among a group of agents, where each agent has a demand for an idiosyncratic good. Thus, we will identify agents with 2 These results also provide a useful tool for analyzing asymmetric CSMs, a topic explored in 5].
their good, and since we will be interested in the consistency of various methods we will allow for the set of agents to vary.
Let the set of potential agents be identi ed with the set of nonnegative integers, Z + , and let N be the set of nonempty nite subsets of Z + . For some nite set of agents N 2 N, their allowed demands will be denoted by q 2 Q(N; q) = 0; q] N , where often q = 1. To save on notation, we will think of q as xed and therefore it will only be implicit in the notation. For example we will usually write Q(N) instead of Q(N; q). The cost of serving these demands is C(q) with C 2 C(N), where C(N) is the set of nondecreasing, continuously di erentiable functions from Q(N) to < + , satisfying C(0) = 0. 3 . A cost sharing mechanism provides a method for computing the cost shares allocated to each of the agents. The following de nition is introduced in 8].
De nition 1 Given N 2 N, an additive cost sharing method x is a mapping x : Q(N) C(N) ! < N + satisfying:
1) E ciency: P n2N x n (q; C) = C(q), 2) Additivity: for all C; D 2 C(N) the following holds: 8n 2 N; x n (q; C + D) = x n (q; C) + x n (q; D): 3) Dummy: For any C 2 C(N) such that @ n C(p) = 0 8p 2 Q(N), then x i (q; C) = 0 for all q 2 Q(N).
Let CS(N) denote the set of all such CSMs.
Note that we use the notation @ n C(p) to represent the partial derivative of C(q) with respect to q n evaluated at p. Let CS(q; N) be the projection of CS(N) onto its second component, i.e., if x( ; ) 2 CS(N) then x(q; ) 2 CS(q; N). Also let CS = S N2N CS(N). The following representation theorem is given in 8].
Proposition 1 (Friedman and Moulin, 1998) For any N 2 N and x 2 CS(q; N), there exists a vector of nonnegative Radon measures indexed by q, f n (q)g n2N each de ned on 0; q] such that for all q 2 Q(N), C 2 C(N) and n 2 N:
and for each q 2 Q(N) and n 2 N the projection of n (q) onto the q n axis is the Lebesgue measure, i.e., n (q)( a; b] 0; q ?n ]) = b ? a for 0 a b q n .
Note that, as written, this is not a complete characterization, since not all vectors of measures lead to valid CSMs. In particular, budget balance need not be satis ed. In 8], a set of restrictions on the measures was given which leads to a proper characterization theorem; however, those conditions are quite complicated. We now present a second representation theorem that is much more straightforward and intuitive. It is based on an important class of CSMs, the path methods.
De nition 2 A path function is a mapping : 0; 1] Q(N) ! Q(N) satisfying the following for each q 2 Q(N): 1) (t; q) is continuous and nondecreasing in t.
2) (0; q) = 0 and there exists at > 0 such that for all t t , (t; q) = q.
Let the set of all such path functions be denoted ?(N).
Also, for each q 2 Q(N) let ?(q; N) be the projection of ?(N) onto its second component, for xed q. Given such a path function, it is straightforward to construct a related CSM.
De nition 3 Given a path 2 ?(N) the \path method generated by " is given by x n (q; C) = Z 1 t=0 @ n C( (t; q))d i (t; q):
As proven in 8], a path method is a valid CSM. A path method is the natural generalization of the well known formula for the Aumann-Shapley method (discussed in the following section). Note also that any convex combination of two CSMs is a valid CSM, and thus any convex combination of path methods is also a CSM. In fact, as the following theorem demonstrates, any CSM can be constructed as a convex combination of path methods. Thus, we have a simple representation of the additive CSM's as a sum of path generated methods. 6 
Examples of path methods
One of the best known CSMs is the Aumann-Shapley method. This method was rst used as a CSM in Billera, Heath and Ranaan 1] to allocate the cost of a shared telephone system and was subsequently characterized in terms of economic axioms in Billera and Heath 2] and Mirman and Tauman 15]. For any N 2 N, it is a path method, x AS , generated by the path n (t; q) = min tq n ; q n ], which is the well known \diagonal path." (Figure 1) A set of nonsymmetric variants of this method has been proposed by Mclean and Sharkey 14] . These are constructed with a weight function w : N ! < + n f0g and are the path methods given by n (t; q) = min t w(n) q n ; q n ]: For example when N = f1; 2g and w(n) = n the path is shown in Figure 2 .
Another well known CSM was proposed by Shubik 20] , and is known as the ShapleyShubik method, since it is the Shapley value of the cooperative game generated from the cost function. Before constructing this method we rst consider the class of incremental methods. An incremental method is constructed from an ordering ! 2 (N), where (N)
is the set of all orderings, i.e., bijective functions ! : N ! (1; 2; : : : ; jNj). The incremental method for order ! is computed as follows.
For any n 2 N and q 2 Q(N; 1) de ne S + (n; !) = fm 2 N j !(m) !(n)g and S ? (n; !) = S + (n; !) n n then x ! n (q; C) = C(q S + (n;!) ; 0 ?S + (n;!) ) ? C(q S ? (n;!) ; 0 ?S ? (n;!) ). This is equivalent to the path method generated by the function ! n (t; q) which is 0 for t < !(n)?1, q i for t > !(n) and (t ? !(n))q i otherwise. For example, let N = f1; 2g and let !(n) = n; the path for this CSM is as shown in Figure 3 .
We can generalize this to a random order method 24] by choosing a set of weights on each ordering w : (N) ! < + nf0g which must satisfy P !2 (N) w(!) = 1. Then the random order method with weights w is given by x w = P !2 (N) w(!)x ! . The Shapley-Shubik method is given by the Random Order method with equal weights:
The generalized serial cost method was introduced in 8] and is based on the serial cost method for homogeneous goods which was analyzed in 17]. The serial cost method for homogeneous goods which was motivated by Fair Queuing 4] in the networking literature and is interesting both axiomatically and strategically. 4 The serial cost method, x SC is generated by the path n (t; q) = min t; q n ]. (See Figure 4 .) Given a weight function w : P ! < n f0g we can de ne the linearly weighted serial cost method as the CSM generated by the path n (t; q) = min w(n)t; q n ] and the exponentially weighted serial cost method as the method generated by the path n (t; q) = min t w(n) ; q n ], two new classes of methods which are applied in 7].
Demand Monotonicity and Scale Invariance
So far, we have imposed no restrictions on the relationship of cost shares for di erent demands, i.e., given a CSM x and a cost function C we have imposed no restrictions on the relationship between x(q; C) and x(q 0 ; C) even if q and q 0 are very close. For example, one might want to require that x(q; C) be continuous in q. The two important axioms which we now introduce are stronger than continuity.
The rst axiom, scale invariance, is well known and was used in the original axiomatizations of the Aumann-Shapley method.
Given 2 < N ++ , de ne (q) by (q) n = n q n for n 2 N and de ne (C) by (C)(q) = C( (q)), for C 2 C(N; 1).
De nition 4 (Scale Invariance) For all N 2 N a CSM, x 2 CS(N; 1), is scale invariant if x( (q); C) = x(q; (C)), for all 2 < N ++ and C 2 C(N; 1).
Scale invariance is the statement that di erent goods are not comparable, e.g. the units used to measure q n cannot be meaningfully compared with those used to measure q m when n 6 = m. We now show that the set of scale invariant CSMs are generated by the scale invariant paths. First however, we need a weak version of continuity, called \dummy continuity", to simplify the presentation.
De nition 5 Given any N 2 N, a CSM x 2 CS(N) is dummy continuous 5 if for all C 2 C(N), n; m 2 N and q 2 Q(N), lim q 0 n !0 x n (q ?n ; q 0 n ; C) = x n (q ?n ; 0; C). i) x 2 SI(N) and is dummy continuous.
ii) There exists a non-negative probability measure on ? SI (N) such that
Proof: This follows upon noting that a scale invariant CSM is completely determined by its behavior on any particular q, such as q = 1. Thus SI(N) is isomorphic to CS(1; N; 1). 2
Another important axiom is demand monotonicity 16, 8] .
De nition 6 (Demand Monotonicity) A CSM in CS(N) is demand monotonic if for all n 2 N and q; q 0 2 Q(N) such that q n q 0 n and q ?n = q 0 ?n and all C 2 CS(N):
x n (q; C) x n (q 0 ; C):
Demand monotonicity can be viewed as an extremely weak incentive constraint, since if a CSM is not demand monotonic then there are obvious incentives for agents to overstate their demands. We do not know the precise characterization of demand monotonic paths, but will study a closely related problem in Section 3.1, when we combine demand monotonicity with a weak notion of consistency.
Consistent Cost Sharing Methods
In this section we provide su cient conditions for a CSM to be consistent. We begin with a formal de nition of consistency.
Mclean, Pazgal, and Sharkey 13] de ne a notion of consistency which is based on that de ned by Hart and Mas-Colell 11] for TU games. Their de nition is analogous to many versions of consistency found in the literature. 6 However this de nition is still quite strong, and we will introduce a weaker condition (dummy consistency) below. Thus, any agent and her cost share can be removed from the cost function without a ecting the cost shares of the remaining agents. We will denote the subset of CS which is consistent by CON. (2j(q m ; tq ?m )j ? q m )q n dt = jqjq n ; 6 See, e.g. Thomson 22 ] for a survey of consistency.
De nition 7 (Consistency)
A
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as expected if Aumann-Shapley is consistent, which will be proven below and was also shown in 13].
By contrast, we now introduce the property of dummy consistency which only requires that dummies can be removed from a cost sharing problem without a ecting the cost shares, a much milder requirement.
De nition 8 (Dummy Consistency) A CSM x 2 CS is dummy-consistent if for all N 2 N, C 2 CS(N) such that agent n 2 N is a dummy agent (@ n C(p) 0), x m (q; C) = x m (q ?n ; R qn n (C)) for all m 6 = n.
Note that when i is a dummy agent, then R q i i (C)(q ?i ) = C(q ?i ; 0 i ), and thus we do not need to impose any conditions on R q i i (C)(q ?i ). Let DCON denote the subset of CS which is dummy consistent.
Dummy consistency seems (to us) to be an extremely natural requirement for CSMs, while strong consistency, which may be desirable, is not be as fundamental. 7 For example, consider the Aumann-Shapley method when C(q) = jq ?m j 2 . Computing directly for n 6 = m yields x n (q; C) = jq ?m jq n , as before, while assuming dummy consistency yields x n (q; C) = R 1 0 2tjq ?m jq n dt; which gives the same result.
Consistent Cost Sharing Methods
In this section we develop partial representation theorems (based on Theorem 1) for consistency and dummy consistency. This will allow us to easily show that many well known CSMs are consistent, and to allow us to construct other consistent CSMs. We rst introduce a new collection of paths.
De nition 9 A path 2 ?(N), for N 2 N is separable if for each n 2 N, n (t; q) is independent of q ?n , which we write as (with a slight abuse of notation) n (t; q n ). Thus, the separable paths generate all of DCON. As the next result demonstrates, all of the previously mentioned CSMs are generated by separable paths and therefore are dummy consistent. 8 8 The boundedness of q in the above theorem does not a ect these results, since we need only check at each nite value of q.
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Corollary
2) Serial Cost and both linearly and exponentially weighted Serial cost.
3) Random order methods and Shapley-Shubik.
However, it is easy to show that not all CSMs are dummy consistent. Consider the case when N = f1; 2; 3g, q = 1 and the CSM is x where (t; q) = (tq 1 ; tq 2 ; (1 ? q 1 )q 3 t + q 1 q 3 t), which is not separable. 9 Let the cost function be C(q 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 ) = q 2 q 3 which does not depend on q 1 . Then x 2 (q; C) = R 1 0 (1 ? q 1 )q 3 t + q 1 q 3 t]q 2 = q 1 q 3 (1=2 ? q 1 =6) which depends on q 1 even though agent 1 is a dummy agent. Thus it is not dummy consistent.
Ordinary consistency imposes a more stringent requirement on the paths. We now demonstrate a dummy consistent CSM which is not strongly consistent. Consider the CSM x , for N = f1; 2; 3g and q = 1, where (t; q) = (tq 1 ; (t + t 2 )q 2 =2; tq 3 ), which is separable and scale invariant. Let C(q 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 ) = q 1 q 2 q 3 . Then x 1 (q; C) = Z 1 0 dt(q 2 (t + t 2 )=2)(tq 3 )q 1 = 17q 1 q 2 q 3 =24; while R q 3 3 (C)(p 1 ; p 2 ) = 17p 1 p 2 =24. If x were strongly consistent, then the cost share to agent 1 could be computed by removing agent 3 yielding R 1 0 dt17(q 2 (t + t 2 )=2])=24q 3 q 1 = 85q 1 q 2 q 3 =288 which di ers from the cost share which was computed directly, e.g. when q = (1; 1; 1) the direct computation shows that x 1 (q; C) = 17=24 while the computation applying strong consistency computes a value of 85=288 which are unequal. Thus x is not strongly consistent. This is because the path which de nes this CSM is not associative.
De
which is nondecreasing in both arguments such that, n (t; n (s; q n )) = n ( (t; s); q n ) for all n 2 N. Note that above characterization is only partial. We conjecture the complete characterization is true when q < 1 10 : all x 2 CON can be written as a combination of CSMs generated by associative paths, subject to a few technical provisos. 11 An important simplifying result, which we now show, is that all demand monotonic methods which are dummy consistent are also strongly consistent, since the paths associated with such methods are associative. Thus it is easy to see that, in this case, ordinary consistency reduces to dummy consistency, which is typically much easier to check.
There are some technical di culties involved with this characterization, when the domain of q's is unbounded, since the limiting behavior of the class paths, which are both demand monotonic and dummy consistent, is not well behaved. Thus we will consider the class of CSMs which are de ned only on a bounded domain.
Let DM be the set of demand monotonic CSMs in CS, for q < 1. Now, the extreme CSMs are constructed from a single in nitely long path. For any N 2 N let (t) be a path de ned on t 2 < + which is nondecreasing such that there exists at > 0 such that for all t >t, (t) q. Let Thus, we can now present a simple su cient condition for consistency: Corollary 2 For any q < 1, if x 2 CS is dummy consistent and demand monotonic, then it is strongly consistent.
Proof: From Theorem 5 we know that all CSMs which are demand monotonic and dummy consistent are generated by paths of the form n (t; q) = min i (t); q i ], where i (t) is nondecreasing. Thus, these paths are associative with (t; s) = min t; s]. Since CSMs which are demand monotonic and dummy consistent are sums of such paths this implies that they are consistent. 2 We now show that all of the previously discussed CSMs are consistent.
Theorem 6 The following CSMs are consistent: 1) Aumann Shapley and weighted Aumann-Shapley.
2) Serial Cost and weighted Serial cost.
Proof: Consistency of Serial cost and Random order methods follow immediately from Corollary 2 and the fact that they are demand monotonic. For the weighted Aumann-Shapley Mechanism it follows upon noting that the path which generates the mechanism is associative with (t; s) = ts, since t w i s w i q i = (ts) w i q i . 2 
Consistent Extensions
As mentioned in the introduction, one important question about consistency is whether two agent CSMs can be extended, using consistency, to general CSMs with an arbitrary number of agents. In 11], Hart and Mas-Collel, showed that in the case of binary demands, if we assume that a consistent CSM when restricted to two agents \divides the surplus equally" then it must be the Shapley Method. For the continuous demand setting considered in this paper, Mclean, Pazgal and Sharkey 13], showed that if a consistent CSM is the AumannShapley method on all 2 agent problems, then it must be the Aumann-Shapley method.
Both proofs require the use of a potential, and do not appear to be easily extendable for studying consistency questions related to extensions of other CSMs.
In this section, we show that when restricted to the case of additive CSMs, problems of this sort are straightforward to analyze by using the representation theorems in the previous section. In particular, we will often be able to use dummy consistency to simplify the analysis. Furthermore, the results for dummy consistency also apply to the case with a xed population where we might have conditions on the CSM when there are a group of dummy agents. For example, consider a three agent cost sharing problem for which we know that when agent one agent is a dummy, the other 2 agents should use the Aumann-Shapley method, but when a di erent agent is a dummy, then the remaining two should use serial cost. Using the tools developed in this section for dummy consistency, we can show that there is a unique CSM which satis es these conditions. (This approach is explored in more detail in 5].) Thus, our goal in this section is to understand when a CSM de ned for two agent problems extends to a consistent CSM for an arbitrary number of agents. Let N 2 = fN 2 N j jNj = 2g and de ne CS 2 = S N2N 2 CS(N), which is the set of CSMs de ned for all two agent methods.
The basic problem that we now consider is this: given an y 2 CS 
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From the previous section we know that if y cannot be generated by associative (resp. separable) paths there can be no consistent (resp. dummy consistent) extensions of y to CS. However, even when y is generated in this way, there may be no extensions or many extensions. We rst show that in a common setting there is at most one consistent extension.
(We give examples of methods with multiple extensions in the following section.) Theorem 7 Let x 2 CS 2 be generated by a single associative (resp. separable) path. Then there exists at most onex 2 CS such that x =x on N 2 and is consistent (resp. dummy consistent).
Proof: Letx be one such extension. Then x is generated by a sum of separable paths k ; however, if the sum cannot be written as a single path, then there must be some N 2 N 2 for which the associated CSM is not constructed from a single path, violating the assumption.
Thus, all extensions must be path methods, but clearly if there were two paths that di ered, then they must di er on some N 2 N 2 . 2
This theorem is applicable to almost all of the previously discussed methods.
Corollary 3 The following methods de ned on CS 2 extend uniquely to DCON (resp. CON):
Random order methods, Aumann-Shapley, Serial cost, and their weighted versions.
Note that the above theorem does not include Shapley-Shubik, since it is a sum of multiple path generated methods. As we show in the next section Shapley-Shubik has many (nonsymmetric) extensions; however, it has only one symmetric extension.
Theorem 8 The Shapley-Shubik CSM de ned on CS 2 has a unique consistent (resp. dummy consistent) symmetric extension.
Proof: Fix N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng Z + such that n 3. For simplicity assume that t 2 0; n].
For any i; j 2 N with i 6 = j, the Shapley-Shubik CSM on fi; jg, CS(fi; jg) can be written as P 2 x =n!, where for n 2 N, n (t; q) = (i) (t)q (i) . It is easy to see that when viewed as a CSM over N, these are the only paths (up to equivalence of reparameterization) which \project" for all i; j 2 N, i 6 = j, to a two agent random order value. Thus any extension to N can be written as P 2 ( )x where P 2 ( ) = 1 and for all 2 , ( ) 0.
However, unless all the 's are equal the method is not be symmetric. 2 
Nonsymmetric extensions
Somewhat surprisingly, a nonsymmetric CSM may be symmetric when \projected" onto N 2 .
For example, as we now demonstrate, the Shapley-Shubik mechanism has (many) nonsymmetric extensions.
Consider the case when N = f1; 2; 3g. We construct a CSM which is a convex combination In general there are even more complex examples of CSMs with non-unique consistent extensions. Note that generically, if x 2 CS 2 is generated by a nite number of paths then the extension (if it exists) will be unique, since the paths can not be`mixed' together; however, in particular cases they can have multiple extensions as shown here. Consider the following asymmetric CSM in CS 2 which is generated by the average of the following associative and where for simplicity we require that t 2 0; 1]. By this we mean that for N = f1; 2g the CSM is the average of the methods generated by the three paths, (tq 1 ; tq 2 ), (tq 1 ; t 1:5 q 2 ), and (tq 1 ; t 0:5 q 2 ).
Clearly, this element of CS 2 has the \natural" extension x a +x b +x c ]=3 (see Figure 6a ).
However, it also has another extension which is given by which is shown in Figure 6b ; however they both have the same projections onto 2 agent methods (see Figure 6c for the projection onto the rst two coordinates). ). In this metric, ?(q; N) is a compact metric space. Note also that in these metrics 22 the mapping that maps to x is injective and continuous as is the mapping which maps x to its related measure . Now we construct the representing measure in the theorem: Let CS(q; N; k) be the set of x 2 CS(q; N) for which their representing measures have support only on the grid g k = fp j 9n 2 N; s:t: 8m 6 = n; 2 k p m 2 Zg (this is a grid and not a lattice, as illustrated in Figure 7 ). Note that g k g k+1 and therefore CS(q; N; k) CS(q; N; 2k) for all k 1.
Similarly de ne ?(q; N; k) which is the set of paths which have support on g k , for which ?(q; N; k) ?(q; N; 2k2) for all k 1. It is straightforward to show that CS(q; N; k) is the set of CSMs which only depend on the value of the cost function at the intersection points of the grid, i.e.,ĝ k = fp j 8n 2 N; 2 k p n 2 Zg. This is the problem considered by Wang 23] . In that paper he proves the following using an elegant argument based on a result of Proof of theorem: Consider some x 2 CS(q; N) and choose any sequence x k 2 CS(q; N; k) such that lim k!1 x k = x. Now, using the above proposition, there exists a sequence of vector probability measures k which represent the CSMs x k and note that k induces a measure on ?(q; N) which we will also (with a slight abuse of notation) denote by k . Since ?(q; N) is a compact metric space, the space of probability measures on ?(q; N) must be compact 18], and therefore there exists a subsequence on which k converges to a measure on ?(q; N). Proof: It is easy to see that a CSM generated by a seperable path is dummy consistent and thus a convex combination of such methods is also dummy consistent; thus we concentrate on the converse, that (i) implies (ii).
Consider some dummy consistent CSM, x 2 DCON: For any N 2 N, using Theorem 1, we can write the restriction of x to N, x N , as an integral over paths. Now for some m 2 N consider the CSM x 0 on N n m. Given C 2 C(N) for which agent m is a dummy we can In addition @ + s (t; s) = @ + n n (t; n (s; q n ))_ n (s; q n )=_ n (t; n (s; q n ));
where @ + denotes right di erentiation and _ n (t; q n ) = @ + t n (t; q n ), 26
Proof: Given q n choose any q 0 n > q n and let s solve (s; q 0 n ) = q n and s solve n (s; q 0 n ) = q 0 n and note that s 0 > s. Then by associativity n (t; q n ) = n (t; n (s; q 0 n ) = n ( (t; s); q 0 n ) and similarly n (t; q 0 n ) = n ( (t; s 0 ); q 0 n ), but since (t; s 0 ) (t; s) which implies that n (t; q 0 n ) n (t; q n ) since n ( ; ) is nondecreasing in its rst argument by de nition. Di erentiating the identity n (t; n (s; q n )) = n ( (t; s); q n ) with respect to s yields @ n n (t; n (s; q n ))_ n (s; q n ) = _ n (t; j (s; q j ))@ s (t; s); thus since all the other right derivatives exist, the right derivative of n (t; q n ) with respect to q n must exist and solve the equation.
Lemma 3 If is an associative path, then x is strongly consistent.
Proof: Note that since all the functions involved ( and ) are nondecreasing and right di erentiable, all the functional compositions which we use in the following calculations are also nondecreasing and right di erentiable. Thus, in the following we use right di erentiation, denoted by @ + . Also, to simplify notation assume that (1; q) = q.
Assume that C is twice continuously di erentiable and that n 6 = m 2 N. Now which equals x m (q; C) ? x m (q ?n ;Ĉ qn ); proving strong consistency for twice di erentiable C.
Since the set of twice di erentiable functions is dense in C(N) this su ces to prove the theorem. 2
Noting that a convex combination of strongly consistent CSMs is strongly consistent, completes the proof of the Theorem. Proposition 3 (Friedman and Moulin (1998) ) If x(q; ) 2 DM(q; N) and (q) is the representing vector measure, then for all n 2 N and q 0 n > q n then n (q) = n (q ?n ; q 0 n ) on 0; q]. Now, consider some 2 ? DM;DCON . By dummy consistency we know that it can be written, for each n 2 N as n (t; q n ); however, by the above proposition we must have that n (t; q n ) = n (t; q 0 n ) for any q n < q 0 n < q whenever n (t; q 0 n ) q n . Thus, we can write n (t; q n ) = min q n ; n (t; q n )]. 2 29
